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Does an inﬂation conservative central bank à la Rogoﬀ (1985) remain
desirable in a setting with endogenous ﬁscal policy? To provide an an-
swer we study monetary and ﬁscal policy games without commitment in
a dynamic stochastic sticky price economy with monopolistic distortions.
Monetary policy determines nominal interest rates and ﬁscal policy pro-
v i d e sp u b l i cg o o d sg e n e r a t i n gp r i v a t eu t i l i t y . W eﬁnd that lack of ﬁscal
commitment gives rise to excessive public spending. The optimal inﬂa-
tion rate internalizing this distortion is positive, but lack of monetary
commitment robustly generates too much inﬂation. A conservative mone-
tary authority thus remains desirable. Exclusive focus on inﬂation by the
central bank recoups large part - in some cases all - of the steady state
welfare losses associated with lack of monetary and ﬁscal commitment.
An inﬂation conservative central bank tends to improve also the conduct
of stabilization policy.
Keywords: sequential non-cooperative policy games, discretionary pol-
icy, time consistent policy, conservative monetary policy
JEL Classiﬁcation: E52, E62, E63
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The pitfalls associated with day-to-day decision making in economic policy
have occupied economists ever since the seminal contribution by Kydland and
Prescott (1977). They show that even well-intended policymakers, i.e., poli-
cymakers pursuing socially desirable objectives, may deliver suboptimal policy
outcomes, if they determine their policies period-by-period rather than suﬃ-
ciently far in advance.
The reason for this ﬁnding is simple: the policy problem for period zero looks
diﬀerent than the one for later periods because of a forward-looking private sec-
tor. While future policy decisions aﬀect today’s expectations and thereby cur-
rent private sector decisions, current policy decisions do not aﬀect past decisions
anymore. Since every period looks like period zero with day-to-day policymak-
ing, this results in suboptimal policy outcomes from an ex-ante perspective.
Probably the most well-known example for a suboptimal policy outcome is
the so-called ‘inﬂation bias’ associated with the day-to-day conduct of monetary
policy, see Barro and Gordon (1983). In period zero the monetary policymaker
is willing to accept some inﬂation so as to increase output. Since every period
appears to be period zero with sequential policymaking and since the private
sector will eventually understand this, the outcome is inﬂation only but no
increase in output, causing the policy to become self-defeating.
Many solutions have been proposed to overcome the monetary commitment
problem. A particularly well-known proposal is due to Rogoﬀ (1985) who sug-
gested installing an inﬂation conservative central bank, i.e., a monetary author-
ity that dislikes inﬂation more than is suggested by social preferences. Rogoﬀ’s
analysis abstracts, however, from the conduct of ﬁscal policy.
This paper asks the question of whether the desirability of an inﬂation con-
servative central bank extends to a setting in which ﬁscal policy might react to
the way monetary policy is conducted. This question is by no means trivial.
As we show, it ceases to be optimal to implement strict price stability once the
presence of day-to-day ﬁscal policymaking is taken into account. Quantitatively,
however, price stability remains close to optimal and so does installing an in-
ﬂation conservative central bank. Indeed, it seems optimal to have a central
bank that cares predominantly about inﬂation and only to a lesser degree about
other objectives. In particular, a central bank focusing on inﬂation exclusively
may not only remedy the distortions associated with day-to-day monetary pol-
icymaking but also those associated with day-to-day ﬁscal policymaking. In
this sense, the case for an inﬂation conservative central bank can become even
stronger once ﬁscal policy is taken into account.
5
ECB
Working Paper Series No 663
July 20061I n t r o d u c t i o n
The diﬃculties associated with executing optimal but time-inconsistent policy
plans have received much attention following the seminal work of Kydland and
Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). Time inconsistency problems,
however, have hardly been analyzed in a dynamic setting where monetary and
ﬁscal policymakers are separate authorities engaged in a non-cooperative policy
game. This may appear surprising given that the institutional setup in most
developed countries suggests such an analysis to be of relevance.
In this paper we analyze non-cooperative monetary and ﬁscal policy games
assuming that policymakers cannot commit to future policy choices. We start
by identifying the policy biases emerging from sequential and non-cooperative
decision making and study how these biases interact with each other. Then we
provide a normative analysis assessing the implications of installing a central
bank that is conservative in the sense of Rogoﬀ (1985).1 In other terms, we an-
alyze the desirability of central bank conservatism in a setting with endogenous
ﬁscal policy.
Presented is a dynamic stochastic sticky price economy without capital along
the lines of Rotemberg (1982) and Woodford (2003) in which output is ineﬃ-
ciently low due to market power by ﬁrms. The economy features two inde-
pendent policymakers, i.e., a ﬁscal authority deciding about the level of public
goods provision and a monetary authority determining the short-term nominal
interest rate. Public goods generate utility for private agents and are ﬁnanced
by lump sum taxes, so as to balance the government’s intertemporal budget
constraint. Monetary and ﬁscal authorities are assumed benevolent, i.e., they
maximize the utility of the representative agent.
The natural starting point for our analysis is the Ramsey allocation, which
assumes full policy commitment and cooperation among monetary and ﬁscal
policymakers. The Ramsey allocation is second-best, it thus provides a useful
benchmark against which one can assess the welfare costs of sequential and non-
cooperative policymaking. The Ramsey steady state is characterized by price
stability and public spending below the ﬁrst-best level. Public spending below
the ﬁrst-best is optimal because it reduces the marginal disutility of labor and
thereby helps sustain private consumption, which is ineﬃciently low because of
the wedge created by ﬁrms’ monopoly power.
However, the Ramsey outcome is unattainable because monetary and ﬁscal
authorities both face a time-inconsistency problem in the presence of sticky
prices and monopolistic competition. While price setters are forward-looking,
policymakers that decide sequentially fail to perceive the implications of their
current policy decisions on past price setting decisions, since past prices can
1Walsh (1995) and Svensson (1997) discuss alternative institutional arrangements for over-
coming the problems related to the lack of monetary commitment.
6
ECB
Working Paper Series No 663
July 2006be taken as given at the time policy is determined. As a result, policymakers
underestimate the welfare costs of generating inﬂation today and try to move
output closer to its ﬁrst-best level.
We ﬁnd that lack of monetary commitment gives rise to an inﬂation bias,
as in the standard setting with exogenous ﬁscal policy. More importantly - and
to our knowledge new to the literature - we show that lack of ﬁscal commit-
ment gives rise to a ﬁscal spending bias, i.e., overspending on public goods. In
particular, in the presence of price stability the ﬁscal authority implements the
ﬁrst-best level of public spending, which is suboptimally high. We also show
that, taking the lack of ﬁscal commitment as given, it is optimal for monetary
policy to implement positive inﬂation rates, as these reduce the ﬁscal spending
bias and thereby increase agents’ utility. Thus, unlike in the standard case with
exogenous ﬁscal policy, price stability ceases to be optimal in a setting with
endogenous ﬁscal policy! These results are proved analytically.
The desirability of a conservative or liberal central bank is a quantitative
issue that depends on whether the optimal inﬂation rate that internalizes its
eﬀects on ﬁscal policy is above or below the monetary inﬂation bias emerging
in the absence of commitment. If the optimal inﬂation rate is below (above)
the monetary inﬂation bias, an inﬂation conservative (liberal) central bank is
desirable.
To investigate this issue we start by characterizing the non-cooperative
Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium, in which both policymakers determine their
policies sequentially.2 For our baseline calibration and a central bank maximiz-
ing social welfare, this equilibrium features a monetary inﬂation bias as well
as a government spending bias and signiﬁcant welfare losses, compared to the
Ramsey allocation. Moreover, the optimal inﬂation rate turns out to be well
below the inﬂation rate emerging in equilibrium. These ﬁndings are robust to
a wide range of alternative model parameterizations and suggest installing a
conservative monetary authority to be desirable.
We then consider a conservative central bank that maximizes a weighted
sum of an inﬂation loss term and the representative agent’s utility, and study
the resulting Markov-perfect equilibria. An appropriate degree of monetary
conservatism eliminates large part of the steady state welfare losses associated
with lack of monetary and ﬁscal commitment. Interestingly, the welfare gains
depend in a highly nonlinear fashion on the degree of monetary conservatism.
While a fully conservative central bank, i.e., an authority focusing exclusively
on price stability, is close to optimal, insuﬃcient focus on inﬂation gives quickly
rise to substantial welfare losses.
When ﬁscal policy is determined before monetary policy in each period,
a fully conservative monetary authority eliminates the steady state distortions
2Markov-perfect Nash equilibria are a standard reﬁnement used in the applied dynamic
games literature, e.g., Klein et al. (2004).
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sey steady state allocation. The case for a conservative central bank may thus
appear even stronger once endogenous ﬁscal policy is considered.
We also study how the conduct of stabilization policy is aﬀected by the
installation of a conservative central bank. Interestingly, a conservative central
bank tends to improve stabilization policy, compared to a central bank that
maximizes social welfare instead. In particular, we show that full conservatism
causes the policy response to technology shocks to become optimal, i.e., identical
to that under Ramsey policy. Results for mark-up shocks are less clear and
partly depend on the timing of policy moves.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. After discussing the
related literature in section 2, section 3 introduces the economic model and de-
rives the implementability constraints for the private sector. Section 4 considers
monetary and ﬁscal policy with and without commitment, derives analytical re-
sults about the policy biases resulting from lack of commitment, and discusses
how these biases interact with each other. After calibrating the model in section
5, section 6 provides a quantitative assessment of the steady state eﬀects gen-
erated by sequential policymaking. Section 7 introduces a conservative central
bank and analyzes the steady state eﬀects of monetary conservatism. The eﬀects
on stabilization policy are discussed in section 8. A conclusion brieﬂys u m m a -
rizes the results and provides an outlook for future work. Technical material is
contained in the appendix.
2 Related Literature
Problems of optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy are traditionally studied within
the optimal taxation framework introduced by Frank Ramsey (1927). In the
so-called Ramsey literature, monetary and ﬁscal authorities are treated as a
‘single’ authority and decisions are taken at time zero, e.g., Chari and Kehoe
(1999).3 In seminal contributions, Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (1983) show that time zero optimal choices might be time-inconsistent,
i.e., reoptimization in successive periods would imply a diﬀerent policy to be
optimal than the one initially envisaged.
The monetary policy literature has extensively studied time-inconsistency
problems in dynamic settings and potential solutions to it, e.g., Rogoﬀ (1985),
Svensson (1997) and Walsh (1995). However, in this literature ﬁscal policy
is typically absent or assumed exogenous to the model. Similarly, a number
of contributions analyze sequential ﬁscal decisions and the time-consistency of
optimal ﬁscal plans in dynamic general equilibrium models, e.g., Lucas and
3Galí and Monacelli (2005) extend the Ramsey approach to the case of a monetary union,
i.e., an environment with a single monetary authority but many ﬁscal decision makers.
8
ECB
Working Paper Series No 663
July 2006Stokey (1983), Chari and Kehoe (1990) or Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2004).
This literature typically studies models without money.
An important strand of the literature, developed by Sargent and Wallace
(1981), Leeper (1991), and Woodford (2001), studies monetary and ﬁscal pol-
icy interactions using policy rules, e.g., Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b) and
Ferrero (2005). This literature, however, does not consider time-inconsistency
problems, as it assumes policymakers to be fully committed to simple rules.
A range of papers discusses monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions with and
without commitment in a static framework where monetary and ﬁscal policy-
makers interact only once, e.g., Alesina and Tabellini (1987). This paper goes
beyond these earlier contributions by studying a fully dynamic and stochastic
model where current economic outcomes are inﬂuenced also by expectations
about the future. This is similar in spirit to a recent paper by Díaz-Giménez et
al. (2006) which determines sequential optimal policy in a fully dynamic cash-
in-advance economy with government debt. While they study a ﬂexible price
model in which interactions between monetary and ﬁscal policy operate through
seigniorage and the government budget constraint, we abstract from seigniorage
as a source of government revenue. Instead, we focus on the interactions arising
from the presence of nominal rigidities.
3 The Economy
In the next sections we ﬁrst introduce a sticky-price economy model, similar to
the one studied in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a), then we derive the private
sector equilibrium for diﬀerent monetary and ﬁscal policy regimes.
3.1 Private Sector




βtu(ct,h t,g t) (1)
where ct denotes consumption of an aggregate consumption good, ht ∈ [0,1]
labor eﬀort, gt public goods provision by the government in the form of aggregate
consumption goods, and β ∈ (0,1) the subjective discount factor. Throughout
the paper we assume:
Condition 1 u(c,h,g) is separable in (c,h,g),a n duc > 0, ucc < 0, uh < 0,








¯ ¯ ¯ bounded for all (c,h,g) ∈ [0,1].
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where yt denotes (private and public) demand for the aggregate good, e Pt is the
nominal price of the good produced by the household, and Pt is the nominal
price of the aggregate good. The demand function d(·) satisﬁes
d(1) = 1
d0(1) = ηt
where ηt ∈ (−∞,−1) is the price elasticity of demand for the diﬀerent goods.
This elasticity is assumed to be time-varying and induces ﬂuctuations in the
monopolistic mark-up charged by ﬁrms. The household chooses e Pt,t h e nh i r e s
the necessary amount of labor eﬀort e ht to satisfy the resulting product demand,
i.e.,






where zt denotes an aggregate technology shock. We assume the mark-up shock
and the technology shock to follow AR(1) stochastic processes, respectively,
ηt = η(1 − ρη)+ρηηt−1 + εηt
zt =( 1− ρz)+ρzzt−1 + εzt
where η<−1 denotes the steady value of the price elasticity of demand, and
the innovations εit (i = η,z) are mean zero, independent both across time and
cross-sectionally, with small bounded support.
Following Rotemberg (1982), we describe sluggish nominal price adjustment









where θ>0 measures the degree of price stickiness. The ﬂow budget constraint
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RtBt in period t +1 , wt is the real wage paid in a competitive labor market,
and lt are lump sum taxes.
Although bonds are the only available ﬁnancial instrument, assuming com-
plete ﬁnancial markets instead would make no diﬀerence for the analysis, since
households have identical incomes in a symmetric price setting equilibrium.
One should note that we abstract from money holdings. This can be inter-
preted as the ‘cashless limit’ of a model economy with money, see Woodford
(1998). Money thus imposes only a lower bound on the nominal interest rate,
i.e., Rt ≥ 1,e a c hp e r i o d . 4









Bt+j ≥ 0 (4)
that has to hold each period and at all contingencies.
The household’s problem consists of choosing {ct,h t,e ht, e Pt,B t}∞
t=0 so as to
maximize (1) subject to (2), (3) and (4) taking as given {yt,P t,w t,R t,g t,l t}∞
t=0.
Using equation (2) to substitute e ht in (3) and letting the multiplier on (3) be
λt
Pt,t h eﬁrst order conditions of the household’s problem are then equations (2),






































Pt denotes the relative price and Πt ≡ Pt
Pt−1 is the gross consumer






which has to hold each period and at all contingencies.
4Abstracting from money entails that we ignore possible seigniorage revenues generated in
t h ep r e s e n c eo fp o s i t i v en o m i n a li n t e r e s tr a t e s .S i n c ew ea l l o wf o rl u m ps u mt a x e s ,o n ec a n
safely ignore the ﬁscal implications of such revenues.
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The government consists of two authorities, i.e., a monetary authority setting
short-term nominal interest rates and a ﬁscal authority deciding on government
expenditures and lump sum taxes.
Government expenditures consist of spending related to the provision of
public goods gt and socially wasteful expenditure x that does not generate
utility for private agents. The level of public goods provision gt is a choice
variable, while x is taken to be exogenous. The government’s budget constraint
is then given by
Bt = Rt−1Bt−1 + Pt(gt + x − lt) (7)
The ﬁnancing decisions of the government, i.e., tax versus debt ﬁnancing, do
not matter for equilibrium determination, since Ricardian equivalence applies
as long as the implied paths for the debt level satisfy the no-Ponzi scheme
borrowing constraint (4) and the transversality condition (6) at all contingencies.
For sake of simplicity, we assume taxes to be set such that the level of real debt
Bt
Pt remains always positive and grows asymptotically at a rate less than 1
β.
Constraints (4) and (6) are then always satisﬁed and can be ignored from now
on. Fiscal policy is thus ‘passive’ in the sense of Leeper (1991).
3.3 Private Sector Equilibrium
In a symmetric price setting equilibrium the relative price is given by rt =1
for all t. From the assumptions made in the previous section, it follows that
the ﬁrst order conditions of households behavior can be condensed into a price
setting equation










+ βEtuct+1(Πt+1 − 1)Πt+1 (8)







A rational expectations equilibrium is then a set of plans {ct,h t,B t,P t}
satisfying equations (8) and (9), the government budget constraint (7), and the
market-clearing condition
ztht = ct +
θ
2
(Πt − 1)2 + gt + x (10)
given the policies {gt,l t,R t ≥ 1},t h ev a l u eo fx, the exogenous stochastic processes
{ηt,z t}, and the initial conditions R−1B−1 and P−1.
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In this section we study the outcomes associated with diﬀerent degrees of com-
mitment in monetary and ﬁscal policy. The main focus is on the steady state
implications of the diﬀerent policy regimes. The impulse responses to mark-up
and productivity shocks will be considered in section 8.
It turns out useful to start by analyzing the ﬁrst-best allocation, i.e., the
allocation that would be achieved in the absence of monopoly distortions and
nominal rigidities. In a second step we consider the Ramsey allocation, which
takes into account both distortions, but assumes commitment to policies at time
zero. In a ﬁnal step we relax the assumption of policy commitment.
4.1 First-Best Allocation








ztht = ct + gt + x (11)
where equation (11) is the resource constraint. The steady state ﬁrst-order
conditions deliver
uc = ug = −uh
showing, as expected, that it is optimal to equate the marginal utility of private
and public consumption to the marginal disutility of labor eﬀort. The next
section shows that this ceases to be optimal once distortions are taken into
account.
4.2 Ramsey Policy
Assuming commitment to policies at time zero and full cooperation between






βtu(ct,h t,g t) (12)
s.t.
Equations (8),(9),(10) for all t
The Ramsey planner maximizes the utility function of the representative agent
subject to the implementability constraints (8) and (9), which summarize the
5Since Ricardian equivalence holds we ignore the ﬁnancing decisions of the ﬁscal authority
and the initial debt level R−1B−1, which do not matter for equilibrium determination of the
other variables. Since the initial condition P−1 simply normalizes the implied price level path,
it can equally be ignored.
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(10), and the lower bound on nominal interest rates.6 As shown in appendix





















cucc ≥ 0. Equation (13) shows that in the presence of mo-
nopolistic competition (η>−∞) it ceases to be optimal to equate the marginal
utility of private consumption to the marginal disutility of labor eﬀort. This re-
ﬂects the labor supply distortion induced by ﬁrms’ monopoly power.7 Equation
(14) shows that, provided q>0, it is also suboptimal to equate the marginal
utility of public consumption to the marginal disutility of labor eﬀort. Both
these eﬀects work in the direction of reducing private and public consumption,
compared to their ﬁr s tb e s tl e v e l .
In the special case of linear labor disutility, i.e., uhh =0 , one has q =0
and it remains optimal to set ug = −uh despite the presence of monopolistic
competition. The optimal provision of public goods is then given by its ﬁrst-
best level. Instead, if uhh < 0, lowering the level of public consumption reduces
uh and thereby helps to sustain private consumption. This makes it optimal to
reduce ﬁscal spending below its ﬁrst-best level, a feature that will prove to be
important subsequently.
4.3 Sequential Policymaking
We now consider separate monetary and ﬁscal authorities that cannot commit
to future policy plans, instead they decide policies at the time of implemen-
tation, i.e., period-by-period. To facilitate the exposition, we assume that a
sequentially deciding policymaker takes as given the current policy choice of the
other policymaker as well as all future policies and future private sector choices.
We prove the rationality of this assumption at the end of this section.
6In what follows, we abstract from the non stationary component of time zero optimal
policies. In our numerical application we ascertain that the time zero commitment policies
asymptotically approach the steady states values reported below and also verify that the non
stationary component does not alter the welfare conclusions.
7From equations (5) and (13), it follows that w =
1+η
η < 1 in steady state, i.e., real wages
fall short of their marginal product.
14
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Consider sequential ﬁscal policymaking. Given the assumptions made above,






βju(ct+j,h t+j,g t+j) (15)
s.t.
Equations (8),(9),(10) for all t
{ct+j,h t+j,Πt+j,R t+j−1 ≥ 1,g t+j} given for j ≥ 1
A ss h o w ni na p p e n d i xA . 2 ,t h eﬁrst order conditions associated with problem














where the ﬁscal authority sets the level of public goods provision gt such that
FRF is satisﬁed, each period.
Consider a steady state in which Π =1 , i.e., with an inﬂation rate equal
to the one chosen by the Ramsey planner. The ﬁscal reaction function then
simpliﬁes to
ug = −uh (16)
showing that ﬁscal policy equates the marginal utility of public consumption to
the marginal disutility of labor eﬀort. While such behavior is consistent with the
ﬁrst-best allocation, it is generally suboptimal in the presence of monopolistic
distortions, see equation (14). Sequential ﬁscal policy implies a suboptimally
high level of public spending, i.e., a ‘ﬁscal spending bias’. This spending bias
causes the Ramsey allocation to be unattainable in the presence of sequential
ﬁscal policy, because either inﬂation, ﬁscal spending, or both must deviate from
their Ramsey values. This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 For uhh < 0,s e q u e n t i a lﬁscal policy implies excessive ﬁscal
spending in the presence of price stability.
The economic intuition underlying this result is as follows. By taking future
decisions and the current monetary policy choice Rt as given, the ﬁscal authority
considers private consumption ct to be determined by the Euler equation (9).
Given this, the ﬁscal authority perceives labor input ht to move one-for-one with
government spending gt. In a situation with price stability, the inﬂation costs
of public spending are zero (at the margin) and can be ignored. This causes the
sequential spending rule (16) to appear optimal. In the general case Π 6=1 ,t h e
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We now consider sequential monetary policy. Given the assumptions made






βju(ct+j,h t+j,g t+j) (17)
s.t.
Equations (8),(9),(10) for all t
{ct+j,h t+j,Πt+j,R t+j ≥ 1,g t+j−1} given for j ≥ 1
A ss h o w ni na p p e n d i xA . 3 ,t h eﬁrst order conditions associated with problem










+2 Πt − 1 −
ucct
uct
(Πt − 1)(θ(Πt − 1)Πt − ztht (1 + ηt)) = 0 (MRF)
where the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate Rt such that MRF
is satisﬁed, each period. Appendix A.4 proves the following result.
Proposition 2 For β suﬃciently close to 1, sequential monetary policy implies
a strictly positive rate of inﬂation in steady state.
Sequential monetary policy thus generates an inﬂation bias as in the stan-
dard case with exogenous ﬁscal policy, e.g., Svensson (1997). Intuitively, the
monetary authority is tempted to stimulate demand by lowering nominal inter-
est rates. Since price adjustments are costly, the price level will not fully adjust,
real interest rates fall, stimulating demand. The real wage increase required
to satisfy this additional demand generates inﬂation, but the welfare costs of
inﬂation are not fully taken into account for reasons discussed before.
4.3.3 Sequential Monetary and Fiscal Policy
We now deﬁne a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium with sequential monetary
and ﬁscal policy. We start by verifying the rationality of our initial assumption
that a sequentially deciding policymaker takes as given the current policy choice
of the other policymaker, as well as all future policies and future private sector
decisions.
The private sector’s optimality conditions (8) and (9), the feasibility con-
straint (10), as well as the policy reactions functions (FRF) and (MRF), all
depend on current and future variables only. This suggests the existence of an
equilibrium where current play depends on current and future economic con-
ditions only, thereby justiﬁes taking as given future equilibrium play. If each
period, in addition, monetary and ﬁscal policy are determined simultaneously,
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tiﬁes the assumptions made in deriving (FRF) and (MRF) and motivates the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3 (SP) A Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium with sequential mone-
tary and ﬁscal policy is a sequence {ct,h t,Πt,R t,g t} solving equations (8),(9),(10),
(FRF) and (MRF).
We now show that assuming Stackelberg leadership by one of the policy
authorities, instead of simultaneous decision making, would not aﬀect the equi-
librium outcome. While the policy problem of the Stackelberg follower remains
unchanged, the Stackelberg leader should take into account the reaction func-
tion of the follower. Importantly, however, the Lagrange multipliers associated
with additionally imposing either MRF in the sequential ﬁscal problem (15) or
FRF in the sequential monetary problem (17) are zero. In fact, these reaction
functions can be derived from the ﬁrst order conditions of the leader’s policy
problem even when the follower’s reaction function is not being imposed.
Intuitively, the leadership structure does not matter for the equilibrium out-
come because the monetary and ﬁscal authorities are pursuing the same policy
objective. Any departure of the equilibrium outcome from the Ramsey solution
is thus entirely due to the assumption of sequential decision making. However,
t h ep r e s e n c eo fd i ﬀerent policymakers and the sequence of moves will matter
once we consider a monetary authority that is more inﬂa t i o na v e r s et h a nt h e
ﬁscal authority, in section 7.
4.4 Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions
This section analyzes how the ﬁscal spending bias and agents’ utility is aﬀected
by the steady state inﬂation rate. Since steady state inﬂation depends on steady
state nominal interest rates only, see equation (9), we implicitly analyze how
the conduct of monetary policy aﬀects ﬁscal policy and welfare. Appendix A.5
derives the following result.
Proposition 4 Assume uhh < 0. In a steady state with sequential ﬁscal pol-
icy, agents’ utility increases and ﬁscal spending decreases with the steady state
inﬂation rate, locally at Π =1 .
The previous proposition implies that price stability ceases to be optimal
once ﬁscal policy fails to commit to its spending plans. Intuitively, inﬂation
increases the perceived costs of public spending for the ﬁscal authority, thereby
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βtu(ct,h t,g t) (OI)
s.t.
Equations (8),(9),(10),(FRF) for all t
Here we assume that monetary policy can commit, but ﬁscal behavior is de-
scribed by FRF. We will refer to this situation as the optimal inﬂation (OI)
regime. If the optimal inﬂation rate is lower (higher) than the monetary inﬂation
bias generated in a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium with sequential monetary
and ﬁscal policy, an inﬂation conservative (liberal) central bank would appear
desirable. Whether the optimal inﬂation rate is above or below the monetary
inﬂation bias is ultimately a quantitative issue. We address it in the next sec-
tions.
5 Model Calibration
To assess the quantitative relevance of the policy biases and the desirability of
a conservative central bank, we assume the following preference speciﬁcation





+ ωg log(gt) (18)
which is consistent with balanced growth, where ωh > 0, ωg ≥ 0 and ϕ ≥ 0
denotes the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity.
The baseline calibration of the model is summarized in table 1. The quarterly
discount factor β is chosen to match the average ex-post U.S. real interest rate
during the period 1983:1-2002:4, i.e., 3.5%. The steady state value for the price
elasticity of demand η is set at −6, implying a mark-up over marginal cost
of 20%. The degree of price stickiness θ is chosen to be 17.5, such that the
log-linearized version of the Phillips curve (8) is consistent with the estimates
of Sbordone (2002), as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a). The elasticity of
labor eﬀort is assumed to be one (ϕ =1 ) and we abstract from wasteful ﬁscal
spending, i.e., x =0 . The utility weights ωh and ωg are chosen such that in the
Ramsey steady state agents work 20% of their time (h =0 .2) and spend 20% of
output on public goods (g =0 .04).9 The process for the technology shock zt is
8As before, we abstract from non-stationary components of time zero optimal policies in
the solution to (OI).
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mark-up shock process ηt is taken from Ireland (2004).11
To test the robustness of our results, we consider also a range of alternative
model parameterizations. For comparability, the utility weights ωh and ωg are
adjusted so as to leave the Ramsey steady state unchanged.
The actual computational method we employ to numerically solve for the
Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium with sequential monetary and ﬁscal policy
is described in appendix A.7. A useful by-product of this approach is that it
delivers second-order accurate welfare expressions for economies with a distorted
steady state, while relying on linear-quadratic approximation only. This will be
useful in section 8 when we analyze a stochastic economy.
6 Steady State Outcomes
Employing the baseline calibration summarized in table 1, we now investigate
the quantitative impact of relaxing monetary and ﬁscal policy commitment. In
addition, we compare the outcome under sequential policy (SP) to that achieved
under the optimal inﬂation (OI) regime. Finally, we analyze the robustness of
the quantitative ﬁndings to diﬀerent model parameterizations.
The ﬁrst row of table 2 presents information on the steady state in the SP
regime. All variables are expressed as percentage deviations from their corre-
sponding Ramsey steady state values.12 The last column of the table reports
the steady state welfare loss, expressed in terms of the permanent reduction in
private consumption that would imply the Ramsey steady state to be welfare
equivalent to the considered policy regime, see appendix A.8 for details. In
line with proposition 2, the sequential policy outcome is characterized by an
inﬂation bias, which turns out to be sizable. In addition, there is a small ﬁscal
spending bias. Overall, the welfare losses generated by the sequential conduct
of policy are sizable, in the order of 1% of steady state consumption per period.
The second row of table 2 shows the outcome under the OI regime. The
optimal inﬂation rate turns out to be not only lower than the one in the SP
regime but also very close to the Ramsey value. Note that reducing inﬂation
from the level of the SP regime to the optimal level increases the ﬁscal spending
bias, as suggested by proposition 4. While the ﬁscal spending increase asso-
ciated with bringing down inﬂation is fairly large, implementing the optimal
10To transform the annual values reported in table 1 of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a),
we raise the AR-coeﬃcient of the technology shock to the power 1/4 and divide the standard
deviation of the shock innovation by 4.
11Table 1 in Ireland (2004) presents estimates for the scaled mark-up shock process
ηt
θ .
Multiplying his estimate for the standard deviation by our price adjustment cost θ =1 7 .5
yields the standard deviation in our table 1. Ireland’s estimate for the technology shock
process is similar to the one used in this paper.
12In the Ramsey steady state c =0 .16, h =0 .2, g =0 .04 and Π =1 .
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with the SP regime. This suggests that the ﬁscal spending bias, despite being
sizable in absolute value, is not very detrimental in welfare terms. Clearly, this
result hinges partly on the assumed availability of lump sum taxes, which ab-
stracts from deadweight losses typically associated with having to ﬁnance ﬁscal
expenditure.13
The results from table 2 suggest that installing a conservative monetary au-
thority is desirable - despite the lack of ﬁscal commitment - because the optimal
inﬂation rate is well below the one emerging in the SP regime. Moreover, a
conservative monetary authority can possibly eliminate large part of the welfare
losses associated with sequential monetary and ﬁscal policymaking.
Table 3 explores the robustness of these ﬁndings to a wide range of changes
in the parameterization of the model.14 The table reports the steady state
welfare losses associated with the diﬀerent policy regimes (ﬁrst column) and
the diﬀerence between inﬂation in the SP regime and the optimal inﬂation rate
(second column). The previous ﬁndings seem fairly robust. In particular, sig-
niﬁcant welfare gains can be realized from implementing the optimal inﬂation
rate. Exceptions are the ﬂexible price limit (θ → 0) and the cases with inelastic
labor supply (large values for ϕ), since the time-inconsistency problems of mon-
etary and ﬁscal policy then disappear and real allocations approach the Ramsey
steady state. The fact that all parameterizations display a positive inﬂation dif-
ferential in the last column of table 3 suggests a conservative monetary authority
should be desirable. We investigate this issue in detail in the next section.
7 Conservative Monetary Authority
This section analyzes whether the steady state distortions stemming from se-
quential monetary and ﬁscal policy decisions can be reduced by installing a cen-
tral bank that is more inﬂation averse than society. Rogoﬀ (1985) and Svensson
(1997) have shown this to be the case if ﬁscal policy is treated as exogenous.
Following Rogoﬀ (1985), we consider a ‘weight conservative’ monetary au-
thority with period utility function
(1 − α)u(ct+j,h t+j,g t+j) − α
(Πt − 1)2
2
where α ∈ [0,1] is a measure of monetary conservatism. For α>0 the mone-
tary authority dislikes inﬂation (and deﬂation) more than society; if α =1the
13A version of the model with distortionary labor taxes suggests that larger welfare losses
are associated with lack of ﬁscal commitment.
14For all parametrization considered in table 3, the utility weights ωh and ωg are adjusted
to leave the Ramsey steady state unchanged. When considering wasteful ﬁscal expenditure
c + x, h and g are required to remain unchanged.
20
ECB
Working Paper Series No 663
July 2006policymaker cares about inﬂation only. The preferences of the ﬁscal authority
remain unchanged.
With monetary and ﬁscal authorities now pursuing diﬀerent policy objec-
tives, the equilibrium outcome will depend on the timing of policy moves, i.e.,
whether ﬁscal policy is determined before, after, or simultaneously with mone-
tary policy. It remains to be ascertained, however, which of these timing struc-
tures is the most relevant for actual economies. While it may take long to
implement ﬁscal policies, the time lag between a monetary policy decision and
its eﬀect on the economy can also be substantial. We thus consider Nash as well
as leadership equilibria.
7.1 Nash and Leadership Equilibria
This section deﬁnes the various equilibria then brieﬂy discusses them.
Consider the case of simultaneous policy decisions ﬁrst. While the policy















Equations (8),(9),(10) for all t
{ct+j,h t+j,Πt+j,R t+j ≥ 1,g t+j−1} given for j ≥ 1
A ss h o w ni na p p e n d i xA . 9 ,t h eﬁrst order conditions associated with problem












2Πt − 1 −
ucct
uct
(Πt − 1)(θ(Πt − 1)Πt − ztht (1 + ηt))
¸ (1 − α)θ − α zt
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For α =0 , CMRF reduces to the monetary reaction function without conser-
vatism (MRF).15 This motivates the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 5 (CSP-Nash) A Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium with sequen-
tial and conservative monetary policy, sequential ﬁscal policy and simultaneous
policy decisions is a sequence {ct,h t,Πt,R t,g t} s o l v i n g( 8 ) ,( 9 ) ,( 1 0 ) ,( F R F )
and (CMRF).
15As before, CMRF implies that current interest rates depend on current economic condi-
tions only, validating the conjecture in (19) that in a Markov-perfect equilibrium future policy
choices can be taken as given.
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monetary authority must take into account how the ﬁscal authority will react to
its own decisions, i.e., FRF needs to be imposed as additional constraint. The















Equations (8),(9),(10),(FRF) for all t
{ct+j,h t+j,Πt+j,R t+j ≥ 1,g t+j} given for j ≥ 1
The ﬁrst order conditions associated with problem (20) deliver the conserva-
tive monetary reaction function with monetary leadership, that we denote by
CMRF-ML. This gives rise to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 6 (CSP-ML) A Markov-perfect equilibrium with sequential and
conservative monetary policy, sequential ﬁscal policy and monetary policy de-
ciding before ﬁscal policy is a sequence {ct,h t,Πt,R t,g t} solving (8), (9), (10),
(FRF) and (CMRF-ML).
Finally, we consider the case of ﬁscal leadership (FL). The ﬁscal authority
must now take into account the conservative monetary authority’s reaction, i.e.,






βju(ct+j,h t+j,g t+j) (21)
s.t.
Equations (8),(9),(10), (CMRF) for all t
{ct+j,h t+j,Πt+j,R t+j ≥ 1,g t+j} given for j ≥ 1
The ﬁrst order conditions associated with problem (21) deliver the corresponding
ﬁscal reaction function that we denote by CFRF-FL. We propose the following
deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 7 (SCMFP-FL) A Markov-perfect equilibrium with sequential and
conservative monetary policy, sequential ﬁscal policy, and ﬁscal policy deciding
before monetary policy is a sequence {ct,h t,Πt,R t,g t} solving (8), (9), (10),
(CFRF-FL) and (CMRF).
We now brieﬂy comment on the previous deﬁnitions. First, note that for
the case α =0all three equilibria reduce to the standard SP regime considered
before in section 6. Second, for the Nash and monetary leadership cases, there
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vatism can possibly achieve. In these cases the ﬁscal authority takes monetary
decisions as given, implying that FRF continues to describe ﬁscal behavior. The
best possible allocation is thus described by the solution to the OI regime of sec-
tion 4.4. Third, in the case with ﬁscal leadership, the ﬁscal authority anticipates
the monetary reaction function. Monetary policy may then use ‘oﬀ-equilibrium’
behavior to discipline the behavior of the ﬁscal authority along the equilibrium
path. Fiscal leadership thus opens the possibility for outcomes that are welfare
superior to those achieved in the OI regime.
7.2 Implications of Central Bank Conservatism
Figure 1 displays the steady state welfare gains associated with diﬀerent degrees
of monetary conservatism α ∈ [0,1], under the diﬀerent leadership arrange-
ments.16 The upper horizontal line shown in the ﬁgure indicates the welfare
losses of the OI regime. Without monetary conservatism (α =0 ) all leadership
arrangements deliver the welfare loss associated with the SP regime.
For the Nash and monetary leadership (ML) regimes, a fully conservative
monetary authority (α =1 ) approximately implements the steady state welfare
level associated with the OI regime.17 With an appropriate degree of monetary
conservatism it is possible to recover the signiﬁcant welfare losses resulting from
lack of monetary commitment, in the order of 1% of steady state consumption
per period. Interestingly, most of the welfare gains are achieved for values
of α above 0.9, i.e., by a suﬃciently conservative central bank caring almost
exclusively about inﬂation.
The case for a conservative monetary authority is even stronger under the
ﬁscal leadership (FL) regime. As shown in ﬁgure 1, a conservative monetary
authority can recover not only the steady state welfare losses stemming from
sequential monetary decision making, but also those emerging from lack of ﬁscal
commitment. With full conservatism (α =1 ) the central bank recovers the
Ramsey steady state. Again, most of the welfare gains are realized for values of
α above 0.9.
Fiscal leadership diﬀers from the Nash and monetary leadership cases be-
cause the ﬁscal authority anticipates the reaction of the conservative monetary
authority. For α =1 , the monetary authority is determined to implement price
stability at all costs. A ﬁscal expansion above the Ramsey spending level would
generate inﬂationary pressures, triggering a strong increase in interest rates so
as to reduce private consumption. The ﬁscal authority anticipates that ﬁscal
spending simply results in a crowding out of private consumption, this disci-
plines its behavior.
16This and subsequent ﬁgures use the baseline calibration of section 5.
17As will become clear from ﬁgure 2 below, the welfare level of the OI regime is actually
achieved by a value of α very close but slightly below 1.
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ues of private consumption, labor eﬀort, inﬂation and public spending depend
on the degree of monetary conservatism. While increased monetary conser-
vatism reduces the inﬂation bias for all timing protocols, its eﬀect on the ﬁscal
spending bias depends on whether or not ﬁscal policy anticipates the monetary
policy reaction. If ﬁscal policy takes monetary decisions as given, monetary
conservatism results in an increased ﬁscal spending bias. With ﬁscal leadership,
however, ﬁscal spending decreases to the Ramsey level as α increases towards 1.
A value of α =1recovers the Ramsey outcome in the FL regime, while a value
of α slightly below one recovers the OI outcome in the Nash and ML regimes.
8 C o n s e r v a t i s ma n dt h eR e s p o n s et oS h o c k s
Up to this point we have restricted attention to steady state outcomes. This
section extends the analysis to a stochastic economy, considering how stabiliza-
tion policy is aﬀected by diﬀerent monetary and ﬁscal policy regimes and the
degree of monetary conservatism.
F i g u r e3d e p i c t si m p u l s er e s p o n s e st oap ositive technology shock (left col-
umn) and positive mark-up shock (right column) for the case with commitment
and under sequential policy.18 The ﬁgure illustrates that lack of monetary and
ﬁscal commitment inﬂuences the impulse responses markedly. Under commit-
ment inﬂation either reacts not at all (technology shocks) or just by a small
amount (mark-up shocks). Instead, inﬂation increases by more and is also more
persistent under sequential policy. Intuitively, positive technology shocks in-
crease the temptation to boost the suboptimally low level of labor supply by
‘surprise inﬂation’, because labor input is temporarily more productive. Sim-
ilarly, positive mark-up shocks temporarily increase the labor supply wedge,
thereby also strengthen the incentives to raise labor input through additional
ﬁscal spending.
Figure 4 clariﬁes how impulse responses are aﬀected by installing an inﬂa-
tion conservative central bank. The ﬁgure depicts the Ramsey policy response
together with the responses for the Nash and two leadership cases (ML and FL),
assuming a fully conservative central bank focusing on inﬂation only (α =1 ).
The left column of the ﬁgure shows that full monetary conservatism causes the
sequential policy response to productivity shocks to be identical to the response
under commitment, for all timing protocols. Full monetary conservatism imple-
ments the optimal stabilization policy in response to technology shocks, despite
the sequential conduct of monetary and ﬁscal policy.
Next, consider the case of mark-up shocks, depicted in the right column
of ﬁgure 4. Under ﬁscal leadership (FL) impulse responses deviate somewhat
18Using the baseline calibration of section 5 we consider a positive 3 standard deviation
disturbance for the technology and mark-up shock values. Responses are presented in terms
of percent deviations from steady state values.
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smaller than in the case without conservatism, compare with ﬁgure 3. With
monetary leadership (ML) or simultaneous policymaking (Nash) the situation
is largely similar, except for the response of government spending, which then
diﬀers markedly from the Ramsey policy response. The discussion in section
6 suggests, however, that deviations of government spending from its optimal
level do not have signiﬁcant eﬀects on welfare in the current setting.19
The previous ﬁndings suggest that monetary conservatism remains desirable
in a stochastic economy because welfare eﬀects tend to be dominated by steady
state considerations. Moreover, monetary conservatism - quite surprisingly -
also tends to improve the conduct of stabilization policy, especially in response
to technology shocks. Clearly, further welfare gains could be achieved through
even better stabilization policies.
9C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper analyzes monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions in a dynamic sto-
chastic general equilibrium model when policymakers lack the ability to credibly
commit to policies ex-ante. It is shown that lack of ﬁscal commitment leads to
excessive ﬁscal spending on public goods, while lack of monetary commitment
results in the well-known inﬂation bias. The welfare losses generated by the
sequential conduct of monetary and ﬁscal policy appear to be substantial.
While optimal monetary policy that appropriately internalizes the ﬁscal
spending distortion implements positive inﬂation, we ﬁnd the optimal inﬂa-
tion rate for our baseline calibration to be close to zero. Also, for a wide range
of model parameterizations, the monetary inﬂation bias results larger than the
optimal inﬂation rate, causing monetary conservatism to remain desirable in a
situation with endogenous ﬁscal spending.
We ﬁnd that large part of the steady state welfare losses associated with lack
of monetary and ﬁscal commitment can be recouped, provided the monetary au-
thority focuses exclusively on stabilizing inﬂation. Moreover, a fully conservative
monetary authority also tends to improve the conduct of stabilization policy.
A number of important questions remain to be addressed in further research.
In particular, for a positive description of monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions,
it seems important to consider also distortionary taxation and government debt
dynamics. These elements introduce additional interactions between monetary
and ﬁscal policymakers that may have a major impact on the desirability of an
inﬂation conservative monetary authority. We plan to extend the analysis to
such richer settings in future work.
19Indeed, computing how consumption equivalent welfare losses depend on the degree of
monetary conservatism α in a stochastic economy, results are virtually unchanged when com-
pared to ﬁgure 1, which is based on a steady state comparison.
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A.1 Ramsey Steady State
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−1 =0for j =1 ,2. W ed e n o t et h eR a m s e ys t e a d ys t a t eb yd r o p p i n g
time subscripts. Equation (25), uct > 0 and Rt ≥ 1 imply
γ2 =0
Equations (26) delivers
γ3 = ug > 0
This and equation (24) gives
Π =1
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uhhη + ug =0 (28)





ucc (1 + η)
(29)
Substituting (29) into (28) delivers
uh −
uc − ug
ucc (1 + η)
uhhη + ug =0














Using (27) again to substitute
η
1+η delivers (14) shown in the main text.
A.2 Sequential Fiscal Reaction Function
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taking as given Rt+j−1 and other variables dated t+j for j ≥ 1.T h eﬁrst order
































t zt =0 (31)
γ1
t uct(2Πt − 1) − γ3
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Using the previous result and (33) to substitute the Lagrange multipliers in (31)
delivers FRF shown in the main text.
A.3 Sequential Monetary Reaction Function
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¸¾
taking as given gt+j−1 and other variables dated t+j for j ≥ 1.T h eﬁrst order
































t zt =0 (35)
γ1
t uct(2Πt − 1) − γ3







Equation (37), uct > 0 and Rt ≥ 1 imply
γ2
t =0
Then solving (34), (35) and (36) for γ3
t delivers, respectively,
γ3
t = uct + γ1
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uct (θ(Πt − 1)Πt − ztht (1 + ηt))
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From (41) and (42) one obtains MRF shown in the main text.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
We ﬁrst show that MRF cannot hold in the neighborhood of Π =1 .I ns t e a d y







+ O(Π − 1) = 0 (43)
where O(Π − 1) summarizes terms that converge to zero as (Π − 1) → 0.I n
a steady state with Π =1equation (8) delivers 1+η + uh




1+η < −1. Since the implicit function uc
uh(Π) deﬁned by (8) exists,
this implies that 1+ uc
uh is bounded away from −1 also in a suﬃciently small
neighborhood around Π =1 . Therefore, (43) cannot hold in the neighborhood
of Π =1 . Moreover, from R ≥ 1 and (9) we have Π ≥ β in steady state. For β
suﬃciently close to 1, it then follows that MRF can only hold if Π > 1.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4













where c(Π),h(Π),g(Π) denote the steady state levels emerging under sequen-
tial ﬁscal policy when monetary policy implements inﬂation rate Π,a n dt h e
derivatives uj (j = c,h,g) are evaluated at this steady state. We ﬁrst evaluate














Using this result and (16), equation (44) can be rewritten as
du
dΠ
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To determine the sign of ∂c/∂Π we totally diﬀerentiate equations (FRF), (8),



















































Assuming uhh < 0, signing these expression delivers ∂c
∂Π > 0 and
∂g
∂Π < 0,a s
claimed. The former inequality and equation (46) imply du
dΠ > 0, locally at
Π =1 .
A.6 Utility Weights
For the period utility speciﬁcation (18), the Ramsey policy marginal conditions















Assuming c =0 .16, h =0 .2, g =0 .04, η = −6 and ϕ =1one obtains the
parameter values in table 1.
A.7 Solving for the Equilibrium with Sequential Mone-
tary and Fiscal Policy
The Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium with sequential monetary and ﬁscal policy






βju(ct+j,h t+j,g t+j) (49)
s.t.
Equations (8),(9),(10) for all t
Et (ct+j,h t+j,Πt+j,R t+j,g t+j) given for j ≥ 1
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already be derived from the ﬁrst order conditions of this problem, see sections
4.3.1 and 4.3.2, respectively. Therefore, the solution of problem (49) will always
satisfy FRF and MRF.
Then, the recursive formulation of the Lagrangian of problem (49) is







{f (·)+βEtW (zt+1,η t+1)} (50)
s.t.
zt+1 =( 1− ρz)+ρzzt + εzt+1
ηt+1 = η(1 − ρη)+ρηηt + εηt+1
where the one-period return is
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¸
with the expectations functions
EAS






taken as given. The additional control variables γ1
t , γ2
t, γ3
t are the Lagrange
multipliers associated with the implementability constraints (8) and (9), and
the feasibility constraint (10), respectively.
We then solve for the steady state using the ﬁrst order conditions of the
recursive formulation (50). Thereafter, we compute a quadratic approximation
of the one-period return f(·) around this steady state. This involves quadrat-
ically approximating the implementability and feasibility constraints. Instead,
the expectation functions EAS
t and EIS




1 (zt − 1) + a1




1 (zt − 1) + a2
2 (ηt − η) (54)
Importantly, postulating linear expectation functions is suﬃcient to obtain a
ﬁrst order approximation to the equilibrium dynamics and policy functions.
The policymaker takes expectations functions as given, therefore, they do not
show up in diﬀerentiated form in the ﬁrst order conditions. Moreover, linear
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to second order. This is the case since either the implementability constraints or
the associated Lagrange multipliers are zero in a suﬃciently small neighborhood
around the steady state. As a result, no ﬁrst order terms appear when evaluating
the quadratic approximation of f(·) at the solution. Obviously, this is just a
restatement of the fact that (50) is an unconstrained optimization problem.
We now explain how we compute the expectation functions (53) and (54).
We start with an initial guess for a
j
i (j =1 ,2; i =0 ,1,2), then we solve (50)
with f(·) replaced by its quadratic approximation. We update α
j
i, as explained
below, and continue iterating until the maximum absolute change of the policy
functions drops below the square root of machine precision, i.e., 1.49 · 10−8.
Let the solution for the policy functions c(·) and Π(·) be given by
ct+1 − c = δcz (zt+1 − 1) + δcη (ηt+1 − η) (55)
Πt+1 − Π = δΠz (zt+1 − 1) + δΠη (ηt+1 − η) (56)
where variables without time subscript denote steady state values. A ﬁrst order
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where |ss indicates expressions evaluated at steady state. These together with
(55), (56) and
Et (zt+1 − 1) = ρz (zt − 1)
Et (ηt+1 − η)=ρη (ηt − η)
deliver the expectations functions consistent with the approximated policy func-
tions
a1
0 = βuc(Π − 1)Π
a1
1 = βρz [(Π − 1)Πuccδcz + uc(2Π − 1)δΠz]
a1
2 = βρη [(Π − 1)Πuccδcη + uc(2Π − 1)δΠη]
a2


















A.8 Consumption Losses Relative to Ramsey




represent the period utility for the steady state of an alternative
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July 2006policy regime. The permanent reduction in private consumption that would
imply the Ramsey steady state to be welfare equivalent to the alternative policy




















where the second equality uses equation (18). Therefore, one obtains








A.9 Conservative Monetary Reaction Function








































zt+jht+j − ct+j −
θ
2
(Πt+j − 1)2 − gt+j − x
¸¾
taking as given gt+j−1 and variables dated t + j for j ≥ 1.T h e ﬁrst order
conditions w.r.t. (ct,h t,Πt,R t), respectively, are given by
(1 − α)uct + γ1
t
µ






























tuct(2Πt − 1) − γ3
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t delivers, respectively,
γ3
t =( 1− α)uct + γ1
t
µ
















































uct (θ(Πt − 1)Πt − ztht (1 + ηt))
(64)























From (64) and (65) one obtains CMRF shown in the main text.
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July 2006Parameter Deﬁnition Assigned Value
quarterly discount factor β =0 .9913
price elasticity of demand η = −6
degree of price stickiness θ =1 7 .5
1/elasticity of labor supply ϕ =1
ﬁscal waste x =0
utility weight on labor eﬀort ωh =2 6 .042
utility weight on public goods ωg =0 .227
technology shock persistence ρz =0 .95
mark-up shock persistence ρη =0 .96
quarterly s.d. technology shock innovation s.d.(εzt)=0 .006
quarterly s.d. mark-up shock innovation s.d.(εηt)=0 .021
Table 1: Baseline Calibration
Policy ch Π g Consumption Losses
Regime (Deviations from Ramsey) Relative to Ramsey SS
SP −0.44% 0.67% 1.46% 0.48% −1.03%
OI −0.83% 0.85% 0.09% 7.5% −0.07%
Table 2: Steady State Eﬀects
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July 2006Consumption Losses Inﬂation Diﬀerentials
Relative to Ramsey SS ΠSP − ΠOI
OI SP (Quarterly)
Baseline Calibration −0.07% −1.03% 1.37%
more competition (η = −9) −0.03% −0.21% 0.56%
less competition (η = −3) −0.37% −8.86% 4.49%
more sticky prices (θ =5 0 ) −0.07% −2.04% 1.19%
less sticky prices (θ =5 ) −0.06% −0.36% 1.34%
almost ﬂexible prices (θ =0 .5) −0.03% −0.05% 0.58%
very low labor supply elasticity (ϕ =8 ) −0.06% −0.07% 0.07%
low labor supply elasticity (ϕ =3 ) −0.12% −0.33% 0.53%
high labor supply elasticity (ϕ =0 .1) −0.01% −2.11% 2.17%
wasteful ﬁscal spending (x =0 .05) −0.06% −0.98% 1.12%
Table 3: Robustness of Steady State Eﬀects
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Figure 1: Welfare Gains From Monetary Conservatism
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Figure 2: Steady State Eﬀects of Monetary Conservatism
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses Without Conservatism (α =0 )
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses With Full Conservatism (α =1 )
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